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experiences with some teachers who failed to return from maternity
leaves of absence.
Cerra is presently on appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.5 6
Hopefully, that court will deal with the constitutional issue squarely,
if the necessity arises, and add a convincing precedent from a state tri-
bunal to the developing case law in the area of maternity regulations.
Although the commonwealth court by-passed the equal protection issue
raised by the case, the recent activity in the federal courts indicates a
strong likelihood that the East Stroudsburg regulation, and others like
it, may ultimately stand or fall on this question.
Richard William Perhacs
AUTHOR'S NOTE: On January 19, 1973, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania filed its opinion in Cerra v. East Stroudsburg Area School
District. The court reversed in favor of the appellant teacher. The un-
animous opinion, delivered by Justice Eagen, failed to reach the con-
stitutional issue raised by the case. However, the court cited Le Fleur
and Cohen and recommended that the reader compare them with the
instant case.
In deciding Cerra, the court regarded the central issue as the "legal-
ity" of the board's action in terminating appellant's contract. The court
thus took a broad view of the possible infirmity of the Board's resolu-
tion and moved beyond a mere consideration of whether the regulation
was "unreasonable" or ultra vires under section 5-5 10 of the School
Code. The decision was largely based on the sex discrimination provi-
sions of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43,
§ 955(a) (1964). The applicability of this statute was proposed by appel-
lant's counsel but not emphasized.
Justice Eagen characterized the board's regulation as "sex discrimina-
tion pure and simple." Interestingly, and, as might be expected, the
court used language which would have been appropriate in disposing
of the case on equal protection grounds. After noting that there was
no evidence that appellant's ability would be impaired after the preg-
nancy, the court pointed out that (1) male teachers are not so harshly
treated in East Stroudsburg and (2) pregnant women are singled out
and placed in a class to their disadvantage. In answer to the "adminis-
56. Cerra v. East Stroudsburg Area School Dist., 3 Pa. Comm. Ct. 665, 285 A.2d 206
(1971), was argued before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania at Philadelphia on Novem-
ber 13, 1972. The decision in favor of appellant was filed on January 19, 1973.'
418
Vol. 11: 411, 1973
Recent Decisions
trative hardship" argument of the appellee, Justice Eagen noted that
any teacher suffering from a temporary disability presents similar prob-
lems. In concluding, he acknowledged the proposition advanced in
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), an equal protection case, that
"efficiency is not the only value to be considered."
It seems that in Cerra the court came to grips with the basic constitu-
tional arguments advanced on both sides of the case, even though there
was no need to dispose of the litigation explicitly on constitutional
grounds. The purpose of both the equal protection clause and the state
civil rights statute is, after all, the prohibition of unreasonable dis-
crimination.
R. W.P.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CHILLING EFFECT ON FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS
-ARMY SURVEILLANCE OF CIVILIAN POLITICAL ACTIvIrY-The United
States Supreme Court has held that allegations of a "subjective" chill
of first amendment rights, due to the mere existence of the Army's in-
telligence and data gathering system, did not constitute a justiciable
controversy since such allegations are not an adequate substitute for a
claim of specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future
harm necessary to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity
of executive or legislative action.
Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
A class action suit was brought by several citizens and organizations,
who discovered that their political activities were the subject of sur-
veillance by the Army,' seeking a declaratory judgment that the Army's
surveillance of their "lawful civilian political activity"2 was unconsti-
tutional and an injunction forbidding such surveillance.
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dis-
missed the suit, declaring that no evidence existed to support the com-
plaint that the Army exceeded its constitutional authority.3 Plaintiffs
appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia which reversed on the ground that the complaint alleging
1. See Pyle, Conus Intelligence: The Army Watches Civilian Politics, WASH. MONTHLY,
Jan. 1970, at 88.
2. Complaint for Plaintiff at 2-6, Tatum v. Laird, 444 F.2d 947 (D.C.C. 1971).
3. Tatum v. Laird, 444 F.2d 947 (1971).
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